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Abstract—Cryptocurrencies have garnered much attention in
recent years, both from the academic community and indus-
try. One interesting aspect of cryptocurrencies is their explicit
consideration of incentives at the protocol level. Understanding
how to incorporate this into the models used to design cryp-
tocurrencies has motivated a large body of work, yet many
open problems still exist and current systems rarely deal with
incentive related problems well. This issue arises due to the gap
between Cryptography and Distributed Systems security, which
deals with traditional security problems that ignore the explicit
consideration of incentives, and Game Theory, which deals best
with situations involving incentives. With this work, we aim to
offer a systematization of the work that relates to this problem,
considering papers that blend Game Theory with Cryptography
or Distributed systems and discussing how they can be related.
This gives an overview of the available tools, and we look at their
(potential) use in practice, in the context of existing blockchain
based systems that have been proposed or implemented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the deployment of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies
have garnered much attention from both academia and indus-
try. Many challenges in this area have since been recognized,
from privacy and scalability to governance and economics.
In particular, the explicit consideration of incentives in the
protocol design of cryptocurrencies (sometimes referred to as
“cryptoeconomics”) has become an important topic.
The importance of economic considerations in security has
been acknowledged since early work by Anderson [1], [2],
who recognized that many security failures could be explained
by applying established ideas from the fields of Game Theory
and Economics. However, it tends to be the case that the
incentives at play are external to the system design (and
sometimes implicit). This leads to failures as the intended use
of systems is misaligned with the incentives users respond to.
Cryptocurrencies, on the other hand, explicitly define some
incentives in their protocols, for example in the form of
mining rewards. The fact that incentives are considered by
default in the design of the system suggests that they could be
properly aligned with the intended use of the system, avoiding
traditional modes of failure. Unfortunately, this has not yet
been the case, as many attacks related to incentives have been
found for many cryptocurrencies [3]–[5].
Failures here arise from the lacking models used in the
design process of cryptocurrencies. While many projects and
papers aim to consider both standard security and game
theoretic guarantees, the vast majority end up considering
them separately despite their relation in practice. To this end,
we consider the ways in which models in Cryptography and
Distributed Systems can be made to explicitly consider game
theoretic properties. We also consider how these can be tied up
into a whole system, looking at requirements based on existing
blockchain based cryptocurrencies.
Methodology: As we are covering a topic that incorporates
many different fields (Economy, Cryptography and Distributed
Systems security) coming up with an extensive list of papers
would have been quite challenging, and would lead to an
output of much greater length. In order to pick a representative
subset of papers, we started by looking at existing surveys
on the topic of Game Theory and Security [6]–[11], as well
as specific book chapters on the topic e.g., Chapter 8 in
the book by Nisan et al. [12]. We then looked at work
published in popular Cryptography venues (e.g., CRYPTO)
where papers on rational cryptography have been presented,
as well as Distributed System venues (e.g., PODC) and
interdisciplinary venues (e.g., WEIS, ACM Economics and
Computation, P2PECON), looking specifically for papers that
cover both Game Theory and Security. Interestingly, few
papers that we present here come from interdisciplinary venues
as the papers published there focused more on applying game
theoretic methods to solve a problem rather than an approach
blending Game Theory and Security ideas, which is what we
aim to discuss.
In many cases, different papers present definitions for sim-
ilar concepts, so for the sake of exposure we do not always
include all these definitions. We also omit to present work
on security and game theory that does not directly relate to
what we discuss, e.g., the body of work by Tambe et al. [13]
about (physical) security and how to apply game theory to
allocate limited security resources (e.g. police force), or by
Grossklags et al. [14] about security investments. Instead,
we focus on some specific models of interest (e.g., Rational
Protocol Design and Bayesian machine games in Section IV)
when we think they are worth more attention. We then match
these concepts with open problems in the security of cryp-
tocurrencies. For each paper or proposed model, we consider
the following questions. What are the assumptions and security
models? How is the notion of security captured in practice?
How are game theoretic aspects included? What are the gaps
or areas that could be expanded on?
Our contributions: The goal of this work is to give an
overview of the intersection of the three fields that are essential
to the design of cryptocurrencies: Cryptography, Distributed
Systems and Game Theory. Our contribution is an analysis
of existing work that proposes solutions to this problem. Our
analysis highlights new concepts introduced by these papers,
as well as deficiencies. We do this in the context of security
requirements that we formulate, arguing that they address
deficiencies in existing security models that fail to cover
all aspects of a decentralized monetary system. Finally, we
discuss open challenges and how they could be addressed.
We give a brief introduction to these fields in Section III,
along with cryptocurrencies, and discuss security in the context
of a decentralized system. In Section IV we then look at the
intersection of Cryptography and Game Theory, followed by
the intersection of Distributed Systems and Game Theory in
Section V. This allows us to review the low level building
blocks of existing solutions, which we put in the context of our
security notions and requirements. We then look at how these
results are used in Section VI, where we look at proposed sys-
tems and their failures, tracing back to deficiencies identified
in the two previous sections. We then discuss in Section VII
the open challenges posed by failures that are observed, and
how they could be addressed. Finally, Appendix A collects
formal definitions for the concepts presented in the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The work that most closely resembles ours are the previous
surveys bridging Computer Science and Game Theory [6]–
[11]. They were of great inspiration for this work, but they are
quite outdated (dating back to 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010)
given the recent output of research tied to cryptocurrencies
and mother blockchain based systems.
On the topic of blockchains, many SoK papers and surveys
exist that cover consensus protocols and security [15]–[21].
These are very different from our work as we present general
concepts and definitions related to designing decentralized sys-
tems with incentives. In particular, many concepts presented in
this paper were not introduced in the context of consensus, but
rather in the context of secure multiparty computation (MPC)
or other problems tied to distributed systems. Mst of the work
presented in this SoK does not directly concern blockchains,
which is the motivation behind this work.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly introduce game theoretic tools
that are mentioned throughout the paper such as solutions
concepts and mechanism design. For a complete introduction
to Game Theory, the reader is invited to look at any of the
books (or other resources) on the topic [22], [23]. For the
sake of exposition we omit to cover concepts that are relevant
e.g., Pareto efficiency and the single deviation test, as these
do not appear in the papers we mention. We also discuss
the interface between Game Theory and Cryptography and
Security in practice, from how both areas define their agents
to the models used to reason about them. We then give a brief
introduction on Distributed Systems and cryptocurrencies.
A. Game Theory and Mechanism Design
1) Games and solution concepts: A game is defined by a set
of n players and a set of actions for each player (A1, · · · , An).
A strategy for player i, denoted σi, is a function from i’s local
state to actions Ai. We denote Si the set of all possible strategy
for player i. We denote ~σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) the joint strategy
of all players and ~σ−i = (σ1, · · · , σi−1, σi+1, σn). We denote
ui(~σ) player’s i utility when ~σ is played. Players may be of
different types, which are denoted θi for player i.
Game Theory uses solution concepts in order to predict
the outcome of a game, the most well known is the Nash
equilibirum (NE). A strategy ~σNE is a Nash equilibrium if
given that all the other players follow ~σNE−i , player i is better
off playing σNEi as well. More formally, for all players i and
all strategies σi: ui(σNEi , ~σ
NE
−i ) ≥ ui(σi, ~σ
NE
−i ). Note that
multiple NE can exist for a given game.
a) Extensive form games: In practice, many games
involve multiple rounds of play with moves made sequentially
by players, as in chess for example. These are generally
described as extensive form games, which can be represented
in a tree form that represents the possible sequences of actions
in the game. Going from a normal form game to an extensive
form games requires specifying an ordering of play, payoffs as
a function of moves, information sets (the moves that could
have taken place given what a player has observed), and a
probability distribution over Nature’s moves (moves by players
with no strategic interest in the game’s outcome e.g., a dealer).
When considering the tree representation of the game, one
can find subgames i.e., subsets of a game that have an initial
node such that it is the only member of its information
set, its successors are in the subgame, and the nodes in
the informations sets of the subgame are in the subgame.
Subgames are very relevant because they allow us to define
a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of a Nash
equilibrium that eliminates Nash equilibria involving irrational
subgame behavior. As in the case of a NE, at least one SPE
is guaranteed to exist for a finite extensive form game, and
we define them as follows: a strategy profile is a subgame
perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every
subgame of the original game.
b) Incomplete and imperfect information: So far we
have assumed that players have complete information about
the game they are in, but this is not always realistic. A game
where players do not always know exactly what has taken
place earlier in the game, is said to have imperfect information.
In the case where players do not know exactly the type of
the other players, which determines their payoff function, the
game is said to have incomplete information.
Imperfect and incomplete extensive form games can be
related by having Nature make the first move in the game
and randomly assign types to players, turning an incomplete
game into an imperfect game as different outcomes of Nature’s
initial move are possible. The players then have a probability
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distribution over the types of other players. (Formally speak-
ing, the probability distribution is over the set of states of
Nature, which are mapped to player types.) The beliefs of
players are expressed as conditional probabilities of a history
in an information set, given the information set. Players can
update their beliefs when they gain new information according
to Bayes’ theorem, leading games of this form to be called
Bayesian games. A collection of beliefs is called a belief
system, which paired with a strategy profile is an assessment.
Now that we do no longer have perfect information, we
must leave behind some solution concepts. The lack of perfect
information means that players cannot always tell which sub-
game they are in, so a SPE is no longer possible. Players now
also think about expected payoffs, so the standard definition
of a NE is no longer ideal but we can define a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (BNE) analogously by replacing utilities
with expected utilities, although we usually still refer to them
simply as utilities. This does not, however, take into account
the beliefs of the players that now have to be considered.
Going further, we can define a sequential equilibrium which
requires an assessment that is sequentially rational and con-
sistent i.e., given any information set reached with positive
probability (according to the strategy profile) the beliefs at that
information set are derived using Bayes’ rule and the strategy
profile. This gives a slightly stronger equilibrium due to the
stricter constraint on the beliefs.
2) Correlated Equilibria: NE and BNE are very powerful
tools use widely in GT, however they also have a lot of
drawbacks (e.g., computing it is not tractable [24]) and do
not yield to the obvious best general outcome (see the famous
prisoner’s dilemma for example [25]). For this reason some
other solution concepts exist. One notable is the correlated
equilibrium. The intuition behind a correlated equilibrium can
be interpreted as follows: let’s assume that there exists a public
signal that tells players what to play; based on the information
they receive players can make inference about the move that
the other players are going to play. For example a public
signal could be a traffic light. If a player sees a red light
they can assume that another player on another line will see
a green light and thus that their best decision is to stop at the
intersection. Thus in a correlated equilibrium, each players
choose their actions according to information given by the
public signal. The role of the public signal is usually to help
players achieve the optimal outcome of the game.
3) Mechanism design (MD) and Implementations: While
Game Theory is typically about understanding the behavior
of players in a given game, systems are usually designed
and implemented with a goal in mind e.g., preventing double
spending in cryptocurrencies. To achieve this, our goals can
be expressed as a social choice function (SCF), a function
that given the preference (or types) of all players outputs an
outcome. For example, in a voting system, given all the ranked
preferences of voters, a SCF will choose a candidate.
Once we have a target outcome in mind, the idea is to make
sure that the incentives are designed in a way such that selfish
players reach this outcome. In some ways, this can be thought
of as reversing the basic idea of Game Theory, designing a
game that leads to a specific outcome.
To do this, we use a mechanism that maps the action profile
of players to a distribution over outcomes. A mechanismM is
then said to implement a SCF f if M(CM (~u)) = f(~u), where
~u is the vector of all of the players utility functions and CM (~u)
represents all strategy vectors that could reasonably result from
selfish behavior. Informally the previous equality means that
whatever selfish strategy players choose, the outcome of the
game will correspond to the SCF. The solution concept is
supposed to reflect reality, in the sense that when it holds,
players’ selfish strategies lead to the desired outcome. For
example in a voting system we would like to design a system
where given all the preferences of the players, the one chosen
by the SCF is elected, one way to do this is to incentivize
players to report their truthful preferences. A mechanism can
also be viewed as a protocol, with the corresponding game
being thought of as having the protocol as the recommended
strategy, and deviations from the protocol as other possible
strategies.
It must be pointed out that doing this in practice is not
always easy, as experimental Game theory reveals. Gneezy
and Rustichini [26] looked at the effects of implementing
incentives at a nursery in order to reduce the rate at which
parents collected their child late. This was done by punishing
late parents with a fine, which intuitively should motivate
parents to arrive on time. Instead, parents interpreted the fine
as a way of paying for extra childcare, and started coming
even later. Furthermore, once the fine was removed as it was
counter productive, the parents behavior did not revert back
so the system had in fact been irreversibly damaged.
A very important result in MD is the revelation principle that
states that any social choice function that can be implemented
by any mechanism can be implemented by a direct truthful
mechanism. (A mechanism is direct if players need only reveal
their type/utility function to the designer of the game and
truthful if players’ best strategy is to reveal their true type.)
B. Agents in Game Theory and Security
Both Game Theory and Security deal with the interaction of
agents in a given setting, but they differ noticeably in the way
they model these agents. On the other hand, security proofs
are often game based, which points to some similarities.
Security scholars deal with adversaries, agents that aim
to circumvent or otherwise break a security property of the
system. The value that an adversary attaches to their success
is not usually given, as security should ideally be robust to any
adversary, although they may have computational limitations.
Game theorists, on the other hand, deal with rational (some-
times also called selfish) agents. These assign a value to their
goals, and would rather optimize their payoff than achieve an
arbitrary goal, but they typically do not have restrictions (e.g.,
computational) like a security adversary would.
In practice, this translates to different assumptions being
used when formally modeling a game or the security of
a system. This makes it difficult to then prove statements
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that involve security and game theoretic properties. As both
deal with different types of agents, a proof will involve the
complexity from both sides and quickly become hard to
manage. This leads to a disjoint treatment of both aspects in
works that attempt to cover both.
Despite this, there are nonetheless inherent connections as
security often uses game based proofs, although an adversary
wins if they have a good enough probability of succeeding
in their attack rather than if their utility is high enough. But
if we assume that the adversary has a high payoff associated
with the success of their attack, then we start to recover game
theoretic intuition. Similarly for proofs based on the simulation
(ideal/real world) paradigm, some connections are evident.
The idea behind the simulation paradigm first originated
in the context of secure computation. Goldreich et al. [27]
introduced the idea of bypassing the need for a trusted third
party (i.e., a mediator) in games of incomplete information, by
replacing it with a protocol that effectively simulates it such
that any information known by players at any step of game
is the same as they would have known in an execution of the
game involving the trusted third party. This was then refined
by Micali and Rogaway [28] in terms of ideal and secure
function evaluation. The ideal function evaluation corresponds
to the evaluation of the function with a trusted third party
that receives the private inputs of the parties and evaluates the
function before returning the result to each party. Intuitively,
this achieves the best possible result. The secure function
evaluation involves the parties trying to simulate the ideal
trusted third party, the protocol used to do so is then considered
secure if the parties cannot distinguish between the ideal
and secure function evaluations. This means that the protocol
performs close enough to the standard of the ideal function
evaluation, and an adversary would not have anything to gain.
Simulation has become a popular tool for cryptogra-
phers [29]. In particular, Canetti’s Universal Composability
Model [30] expands on these ideas to provide a framework for
secure composability of protocols. As the UC model is used
in some of the work that is covered in Section IV, we quickly
introduce it here. Canetti considers an ideal functionality F ,
an algorithm for the trusted party, that is executed in an
instance of the ideal protocol. A protocol π then UC-realizes
an ideal functionality F if it emulates the instance of the ideal
protocol for F . The protocol π UC-emulates a protocol φ if
for any adversary A there exists an adversary S (also called
the simulator) such that, for any environment ǫ, the output of
ǫ interacting with A and parties running π is indistinguishable
from the output of ǫ interacting with S and φ. This builds on
the idea of secure function evaluation, where φ will be the
ideal protocol of some ideal functionality F . If the outputs of
π are then indistinguishable from those provided by F then
we recover Micali and Rogaway’s idea of secure computation.
Using this, the UC-model guarantees composability in the
sense that if π UC-emulates φ, then for any composed protocol
ρpi→φ UC-emulates ρ i.e., if ρ has φ as subroutine, then
replacing calls to φ by calls to π does not change the behavior
of ρ. This is formalized with interactive Turing machines
(ITM) as model of computation, and allows for parallel and
sequential executions of a protocol that is secure.
C. Distributed Systems (DS)
A distributed system is a system that consists of a set of
connected components that communicate with each other in
order to achieve a common goal. One important problem is
the consensus or Byzantine agreement one where, informally,
the components of the system have to agree on a single value.
DS consider two types of agents, good (i.e., agents that
follow the protocol) and bad agents that can be of different
types (e.g., a crash fault where a component halts). In this
paper we will focus on the most general type of fault,
Byzantine faults, where a bad agent may act in an arbitrary
way. Traditionally, DS focus on proving two properties: safety
and liveness. Intuitively, these properties are often summarized
as follows. Safety means that nothing bad happens and liveness
says that something good eventually happens.
For example, a solution to a consensus problem usually
requires three conditions to be met, agreement (all good agents
should agree on the same value), validity (if all good agents
have the same initial value then they should agree on that
value), termination (all good agents should decide on a value).
Agreement and validity fall under safety and termination under
liveness. A system where the safety and liveness conditions are
met even in the presence of Byzantine fault is called Byzantine
fault tolerant.
A famous solution to the consensus problem in the presence
of Byzantine adversaries, is the Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance algorithm (PBFT) [31] that can tolerate up to a
third of the network being Byzantine. PBFT proceeds in three
phases: pre-prepare, prepare and commit. At each stage each
player usually needs to multicast a message to their peers,
making the message complexity of this protocol very high
and thus inapplicable to large networks.
Additionally, in traditional Distributed Systems, the set of
participants is not fully open in order to defend against Sybil
attacks where an adversary create many identities to take
control of the network.
D. Decentralization, incentives and security
Because the security of most decentralized systems, like
cryptocurrencies, is linked not only to the security of the proto-
cols, but also to having a majority of participants following the
rules, decentralization and incentives have to be considered.
The ideal system does not depend in any way on any
single party, which requires it to be decentralized. Troncoso
et al. [32] give an overview of decentralized systems, defining
a decentralized system as “a distributed system in which
multiple authorities control different components and no single
authority is fully trusted by all others”. This highlights the fact
that every component of the system should be decentralized,
and in particular a single authority distributing its own system
(or component) is not decentralized. This can be hard to
achieve in practice, and the level of decentralization of a
system should always be looked at critically. A decentralized
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system where all important parties are independent but under
the jurisdiction of a single government may not truly be decen-
tralized. All these independent parties may also depend on a
very few hardware manufacturers (or other service providers).
Incentives are key to achieving an honest majority. Azouvi
et al. [33] give an overview of the role incentives play in
security protocols, including cryptocurrencies. This highlights
the fact that achieving guarantees of equilibria on paper may
not be meaningful in practice when the wrong assumptions
and models are used.
What does security mean in this context? Clearly, protocols
that are cryptographically secure, and that achieve safety
and liveness guarantees are needed, otherwise everything else
would not work. But if the security of the system also depends
on achieving a high enough degree of decentralization, more
than standard security properties is required. In particular,
decentralization relates to the participants and their behavior
rather than solely the protocol. Any decentralized protocol
can always be ran in a centralized manner, so it is not
enough to design a system that can be used in a decentralized
manner. Rather, the requirement is to design a system that is
advantageous to use in decentralized manner.
Doing this naturally requires a better understanding of why
users would want to be decentralized rather than try to gain
more individual control of the system for themselves, so
security is no longer just about the protocol itself, but also
about how it can be used and how it is used.
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin represents an impor-
tant innovation from classical consensus protocols as it is
fully open and decentralized. In the Bitcoin consensus protocol
(sometimes called Nakamoto consensus) participants can join
and leave as they wish, and Sybils are handled through the
use of Proof-of-Work (PoW).
The data structure that keeps track of the state of the system
in Bitcoin is a chain of chronologically ordered blocks i.e., the
blockchain, with each block containing a list of transactions.
To win the right to append a block (and win the block reward),
participants compete to solve a computational puzzle i.e., a
PoW. They include in their block the solution to that puzzle,
the PoW, such that other players can verify its correctness. This
block then initiate a new puzzle to be solved. This process of
creating new blocks is called mining and participants in this
protocol are called miners.
If two participants find a solution at roughly the same time,
two blocks will be created at the same height in the chain,
creating a fork, which is problematic as the two blocks can
contain conflicting transactions. To resolve this, each partic-
ipants will choose one of the two blocks and start creating
a new block on top of it by solving the associated PoW.
Whenever a chain becomes longer than the other, participants
will abandon the shortest one. As it is unlikely that two chains
will keep the same length for a long time, participants then
reach consensus by following the longest chain rule.
The security of Bitcoin relies on a majority of the mining
power (i.e., hashing power) in the network following the proto-
col, whether because they are honest or simply rational. Taking
control of half of the computational power of Bitcoin for only
an hour has a considerable cost (around 670k USD [34] as of
May 2019), although it is with reach of potential adversaries.
This cost depends on the hash rate of the network (i.e., the
cost of mining) and the price of Bitcoin in USD as once
mining is no longer profitable for some miners they are likely
to stop mining, reducing the hashing power required to control
a majority of the network.
This is one of the reason why Bitcoin’s security is so tightly
linked to incentives, as when mining is no longer worthwhile
the security of the network decreases. Participation in the
network is also rewarded by financial gain (through block
rewards and transaction fees). The more participants there
are, the harder it is to attack the network since the cost for
mounting a 51% attack (where an adversary takes control of
more than half of the computational power) increases. These
financial motivations are thus also paramount.
Since Bitcoin’s deployment, many alternative cryptocurren-
cies that similarly rely on a blockchain have emerged. The
most popular of these is Ethereum [35], which differs from
Bitcoin in that it provides a more complex scripting language
meaning that rather than processing simple transactions, nodes
in the system execute a script that allows users to perform
multitude of functionalities (so-called smart contracts).
Because PoW consumes a high amount of energy, alter-
native consensus protocols have been proposed, e.g. Proof-
of-Stake (PoS) [36]. Considering PoW as a mechanism that
elects a leader based on their computational power (i.e., the
participant who solves the PoW first wins), PoS can be thought
of as a mechanism that elects a leader based on the amount
of stake (i.e., coins) that they have in the system.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND GAME THEORY
Cryptography considers a worst-case adversary. By relaxing
this assumption, it is possible to design protocols that bypass
impossibility results or achieve better efficiency than existing
ones, while maintaining a realistic adversarial model. This
section considers work at the intersection of Game Theory and
Cryptography. First, in Section IV-A, we introduce the subfield
of rational cryptography that considers a rational adversary and
incorporates game theoretic notions like utility functions to
cryptographic schemes. We particularly focus on the Rational
Protocol Design framework of Garay et al. [37]. The approach
taken here is to combine the UC framework (introduced in
Section III), with some MD notions. Next, in Section IV-B,
we look at another approach that consists in adapting game
theoretic notions to consider computational aspects in games.
A. Cryptography meets Game Theory: Rational Cryptography
Initiated by Dodis, Rabin and Halevi [38] rational cryptog-
raphy is a subfield of cryptography that incorporates incentives
in cryptographic protocols. In this context, new adversaries and
their capabilities have to be defined, as well as how to account
for incentives and how protocols can be proven secure for such
adversaries.
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First, we note that most of this work [39]–[45] focuses
on multi-party secret sharing or secure function evaluation.
Thus, no monetary incentive is usually considered. As pointed
out by Dodis and Rabin [45], in a rational cryptographic
context, the utilities of the players are usually dependent on
cryptographic considerations such as: correctness (a player
prefers to compute the function correctly), exclusivity (a player
prefers that other players do not learn the value of the function
correctly), privacy (a player does not want to leak information
to other players), voyeurism (a player wants to learn as much
as possible about the other parties).
In addition to the above, other interesting parameters can
come to play in the adversary’s utility function. For example,
Aumann and Lindell [46] formalized the concept of covert
adversaries that may deviate from the protocol but only if they
are not caught doing so. As they argue, there are many obvious
situations where parties cannot afford the effect of being
caught cheating. Security is based on the ideal/real simulation
paradigm, with successful cheating defined as behavior that
cannot be simulated in the ideal model. This is done by
allowing the ideal model simulator S to fail, meaning that the
output distribution of the protocol in the real world cannot be
simulated. If these output distributions can be distinguished
with probability ∆, the honest parties will detect a corrupt
party cheating with probability at least ǫ · ∆, where ǫ is the
deterrence factor. Thus the probability that honest parties will
detect cheating is directly related to the probability that the
simulator may fail in its simulation. A special cheat instruction
that can be sent by the adversary to the third party is added
to the ideal model.
Covert adversaries are somehow similar to adding a punish-
ment to the utility function. Rational players do not want to
be caught cheating as the punishment decreases their utility.
In Aumann and Lindell’s setting the protocol detects the
cheating, but in practice we need to incentivize participants
to do so.Some work considers adding adversarial behavior
together with rational adversaries [47], we consider this further
in Section V.
In terms of equilibria, the solution concepts proposed in
these works are often extensions of a NE. For example,
Halpern and Teague look for a NE that remains after other
NE that are weakly dominated (i.e., at best only as good
as others) are removed through iterated deletion, where all
dominated strategies are removed at each step [39]. Asharov
et al. [44] adapt the simulation-based definition to capture
game-theoretic notions of (for example) fairness, meaning that
one party learns the output of a computation if and only if
the other does as well. The approach they take is to add a
utility function for each notion of security considered (e.g., for
correctness the utility will be 1 if the output is correct and 0
otherwise). They then show an equivalence theorem that states,
roughly, that following the protocol is a Nash equilibrium if
the protocol correctly computes the multi-party function in the
presence of fail-stop adversaries. As their notions are weaker
than standard cryptographic definitions, they can be achieved
in some settings where impossibility results usually hold in
traditional cryptography.
Rational Protocol Design: Following the work presented
above, Garay et al. propose Rational Protocol Design
(RPD) [37]. In this setting, they define a game between the
designer of the protocol D and the attacker A. The number of
parties n is known to A and D. The game is parametrized by
a multi-party functionality F and consists of two sequential
moves. In the first step, D sends to A the description π of the
protocol that honest parties are supposed to execute. In the
second step, A chooses a polynomial-time interactive Turing
machine (ITM)Adv to attack the protocol. The corresponding
game is noted GM, where M corresponds to the attack model
which specifies the functionality, the action sets and utilities.
A strategy profile of an attack game GM is defined as a vector
(π,A). The game is zero-sum in the original paper, but was
later adapted to be a non-zero sum game in the context of
Bitcoin [48].
The methodology used to define the attacker’s utility con-
sists of three steps. First, relaxing the functionality F to 〈F〉
which explicitly allows for some security breaches. Second,
defining the payoff of any ideal-world adversary as a function
v of the view of any ideal evaluation of the relaxed function-
ality. Third, assigning to each adversarial strategy for a given
protocol the expected payoff achieved by the best simulator.
The best simulator here is the simulator that successfully
emulates Adv while achieving the minimum score (the idea
being that the adversary should be rewarded only if it forces
the simulator to provoke an event).
In follow-up work [49], notions of fairness are also con-
sidered, and provide a mean of comparison between protocols
i.e., which protocol is the fairer. Informally, a protocol π will
be at least as fair as another protocol π0 if the utility of the best
adversary A attacking π (i.e., the adversary which maximizes
uA(π,A)) is no larger than the utility of the best adversary
attacking π0, except for some negligible quantity.
The solution concept introduced within the RPD framework
is ǫ−subgame perfect equilibrium where the parties’ utilities
are ǫ close to their best response utilities. When it comes
to security, the RPD framework defines the notion of attack-
payoff security. Informally, attack payoff security states that
an adversary has no incentive to deviate from the protocol.
Another concept, incentive compatibility, was introduced
in a follow-up work of RPD [48]. Here, the definition is
slightly different than the definition usually given within MD
where participants achieve the best outcome by revealing their
true preferences. Informally, incentive compatibility states that
agents gain some utility when participating in the protocol i.e.,
they choose to play instead of “staying at home”.
To sum up, a protocol is secure in the RPD framework if it
UC-emulates the relaxed functionality and an adversary has no
incentive in exploiting the attack. In their work on Bitcoin [48],
Badertscher et al. state that it is only necessary to consider the
real world and not the ideal world in proofs. This makes us
wonder whether this framework could be simplified more.
Apart from the recent work of Badertscher, et al. [48],
rational cryptography does not consider monetary payment.
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One important drawback of RPD is that it does not consider
the presence of irrational adversaries despite the fact that
in security, we do not always know the motivation of an
attacker. RPD uses a relaxed functionality to allow for some
defined attacks but this may not cover all attacks, leaving the
door open to potential attacks. The UC model is meant to
account for everything that could happen in the environment
(i.e., the universe of the protocol) but it is a computational
model, when they add incentives into their consideration, the
UC model does not automatically start accounting for all
possible incentives - this is a clear flaw as we know that
only arbitrarily considering incentives leads to failures (e.g.,
failure of considering outside incentives, or in general "soft"
incentives like political and other external incentives [33]).
B. Game Theory meets Cryptography: computational games
The classic MD literature largely ignores computational
considerations. The challenge is to make mechanisms com-
putationally feasible without sacrificing useful game-theoretic
properties, such as efficiency and strategy-proofness.
Rather than starting from a cryptographic setting and incor-
porating game theoretic notions, as presented in Section IV-A,
one can also start from a game theoretic setting and from
there move towards cryptographic notions by considering the
computational aspects of games. This approach is taken in a
body of work by Halpern and Pass that considers Bayesian
machine games first introduced in a preprint [50] that has
later appeared in different forms [51]–[53], primarily venues
focused on Economics rather than Security.
A Bayesian machine game (BMG) is defined very similarly
to a standard Bayesian game (introduced in Section III), it
only differs in that it considers the complexity (in computation,
storage cost, time or otherwise) of actions in the game. This is
done by having players pick machines (e.g., a TM or ITM) that
will execute their actions and defining a complexity function
for that machine, which the utility takes into account.
A Nash equilibrium for a BMG is expressed in the usual
way, but it now takes into account the machine profile rather
than a strategy profile. There is, however, an important distinc-
tion to make between a standard Nash equilibrium and a Nash
equilibrium in machine games, which is that the latter may not
always exist. The necessary conditions for the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in a machine game are given by Halpern
and Pass [50] to be a finite type space, bounded machines
and a computable game. A follow up paper by Halpern et
al. [54] discusses the general question of the existence of a
Nash equilibrium for resource bounded players.
So far, the discussion of computational games has not
yet touched on security related issues, but Halpern and Pass
prove an equivalence theorem that relates the idea of universal
implementation in a BMG to the standard notion of secure
computation in Cryptography [27], [55]. Intuitively, this goes
back to the work of Goldreich, Micali and Widgerson [27]
that first expressed (to the best of our knowledge) the idea
of secure computation as the replacement of a mediator in a
game that preserves an equilibrium.
A universal implementation corresponds to the idea that a
BMG implements a mediator if whenever a set of players want
to truthfully provide their input to the mediator, they also want
to run their machine using the same input, preserving the
equilibrium and action distribution. There are then multiple
equivalence theorems of different strength (up to the informa-
tion theoretic case), that relate flavors of secure computation
to flavors of implementation. The relation is important, as
it not only implies that secure computation leads to a form
of game theoretic implementation, but also the reverse. This
opens up the option that the guarantees of (some flavor of)
secure computation could be achieved by considering the
Game Theory of a problem, although it is not clear whether
this process would be more efficient.
Taking a step back from implementations, there are other
aspects of BMG to consider. As outlined in Section III, a Nash
equilibrium is not the only solution concept one might look for,
and many situations that might be encountered in security can
be looked at in the form of incomplete information extensive
form games involving sequential actions. The information sets
of players then correspond to the histories of computation
where a player is in a given state at the end of the history.
This means that players choose their information sets, much
like they choose their machine. Halpern, Pass and Lior [56]
cover the topic in much detail. A useful solution concept to
consider in such a setting is that of sequential equilibrium,
which for the case of BMGs is considered in yet another
paper by Halpern and Pass [57]. They define a sequential
equilibrium in computational games in the same way as a
traditional sequential equilibrium. The difference is that as in
the case of a NE, the utilities are given for machines with
respect to a machine profile.
The belief portion of the sequential equilibrium plays an
important role. For many systems of interest in, for example,
the cryptocurrency community, participation is a voluntary
action. Participants in the network can choose to join and leave
at any time. They may also choose to be involved simply as
a user, by running a full node, or by being a miner. Each
of these represents different levels of initial investment and
continuous cost that depend on the belief the participant has
about the network in its current state, taking into account past
information, and its possible future states.
The equilibrium comes in two variants, ex ante and interim.
In the ex ante case the player commits to their strategy before
the game starts but chooses it such that it remains optimal even
off the equilibrium path in the game’s tree, while in the interim
case the player can reconsider whether they are doing the right
thing at each information set and change accordingly. Both are
related by the fact that every interim equilibrium is an ex ante
equilibrium, and in a machine game with a local complexity
function, the interim and ex ante equilibria coincide.
They are also related to the Nash equilibrium defined above.
To start off, as is more intuitive, every ex ante sequential
equilibrium, and hence also interim sequential equilibrium, is
a Nash equilibrium. In the other direction, a NE can also imply
an ex ante equilibrium if it is lean i.e., if for all players playing
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the machine profile of the equilibrium, the local states of their
machines are reached with positive probability. It is then also
necessary that the belief assessment be compatible with ~M .
BMG have natural applications to known security problems.
For example, dealing with covert adversaries as described by
Aumann and Lindell [46] (already introduced in this section)
can be done by introducing a (two player, for example)
mediated game where the honest strategy is to report your
input to the mediator and output its reply (with utility 12 ), and
the string punish can be output by a player to ensure the other
receives payoff 0. Then any secure computation with respect
to covert adversaries with deterrent (probability of getting
caught cheating) 12 is an implementation of the mediator as the
expected utility of a cheating player will be 12 · 1+
1
2 · 0 =
1
2 ,
which is the same as that of the honest strategy.
V. DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS AND GAME THEORY
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) is concerned with
designing games such that self-interested players achieve
the game designer’s goals, in the same way that distributed
systems designers aim, for example, to achieve agreement in
the presence of Byzantine players. AMD was first introduced
by Nisan and Ronen [58] who proposed that an algorithm
designer should ensure that the interests of participants in a
distributed setting are best served by behaving correctly i.e.,
the algorithm designer should aim for incentive compatibility.
The framework of Nisan and Ronen is defined for a cen-
tralized computation, but it has been extended to distributed
algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) following work by
Feigenbaum et al. on cost sharing algorithms for multicast
transactions [59]. This lead to further developments and appli-
cations of DAMD to interdomain routing, web caching, peer-
to-peer file sharing, application layer overlay networks and
distributed task allocation, which are summarized in a review
by Feigenbaum and Shenker [60].
In this section, we present the work that is at the intersection
of Game Theory and Distributed Systems, looking at concrete
problems that have been well studied. For each case we will
illustrate important concepts and techniques used.
A. Public goods, free riding and hidden actions
Public goods, which are produced at a cost but available
to use for free, naturally occur in distributed systems. In a
public goods game, players choose to contribute a certain
amount, with all contributions being combined and distributed
among all players. Naturally, this can lead to players rationally
deciding to contribute less to maximize their utility. They may
even contribute nothing, which is generally referred to as free
riding.
Varian first considered modeling the reliability of a system
as a public good [61]. The reliability can either depend on the
total effort (sum of the efforts exerted by the individuals),
on the weakest link (minimum effort) or on the best shot
(maximum effort). E.g., if there is a wall defending a city, its
reliability can depend on the sum of all the work provided by
the builders (total effort), on the lowest height (weakest link)
or if we consider several walls, on the highest one (best shot).
In the case of total effort the NE corresponds to all players free
riding on the player with highest benefit-cost ratio. Moreover,
the effort exerted in the NE is always lower than the social
optimum i.e., the best outcome across all players.
Peer-to-peer file sharing also provides an interesting case
of a networked system that has faced free riding [62]. As
explained by Babaioff et al. [63], solutions to this problem
could be based on a reputation system, barter or currency. In
practice, these solutions are not always implemented in the
system itself but rather added in an ad hoc way by users.
Another approach, that would not need to keep any long term
state information is to replace indirect reciprocity with direct
reciprocity. For example, a file in BitTorrent is partitioned into
smaller chunks, requiring repeat interactions among peers and
enforcing more collaboration between them [64]. In practice,
however, this has been shown to not be very effective as it is
not robust to strategic agents [65] and induces free riding [66].
There is also the problem of dealing with newcomers, as
an adversary can create new identities in order to abuse the
system. Analyzing the incentives at play, Feldman et al. [67]
suggest that penalizing all newcomers may be an effective way
of dealing with the problem, as it is not possible to penalize
only users abusing the system.
In addition to free-riding, there are many other parameters
that a selfish player could abuse in a P2P file sharing system
e.g., when to join or leave, who to connect to, untruthful
sharing information, and so on. This is the problem of hidden
actions i.e., how peers selfishly behave when their actions
are hidden from the rest of the network. In order to analyze
the degradation due to hidden actions, Babaioff et al. [63]
apply the principal-agent framework, due to the similarity of
the hidden action problem with that of moral hazard. This
framework is used in economics when one entity, the principal,
employs a set of n agents to take actions on its behalf.
The principal will pay each agent to reward them for their
effort, based on each observable action. In order to capture
the efficiency of a system in that framework, they define
the Price of Unaccountability of a technology as the worst
ratio between the principal’s utility in the observable-actions
case and the hidden actions case. Dealing with observable
and hidden actions relates to the transparency of the system,
which can be approached from a cryptographic point of view
to ensure that agents all see the same set of actions (assuming
that they are logged) [68].
Another solution, Karma [69], proposes a system for peer-
to-peer resource sharing that avoids free riding, based on a
combination of reputation system and consensus protocols. It
can been seen as a precursor of Bitcoin as it considers both a
version of PoW and the idea of rewarding peers in the system
for their effort.
Another important problem in Distributed Systems where
rationality can cause problems is routing [70]. The problem is
to find a path that minimizes the latency between a source
and a target. One of the difficulties in doing so is that
in a decentralized communication network it is not always
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possible to impose some routing strategy to nodes in order to,
for example, regulate the load on a route. as highlighted in
Section III, nodes usually act according to their own interests,
which can be orthogonal to the overall optimal equilibrium.
A game theoretic measure used by Roughgarden and Tardos
in the context of routing is the Price of Anarchy [70], which
quantifies how much a system degrades due to selfish behavior.
More formally, assuming we have a measure of the efficiency
of each outcome, the Price of Anarchy is the ratio between
the equilibrium and the optimal outcome.
Inspired by this measure, Grossklags et al. [71] introduce the
Price of Uncertainty, which measures the cost of incomplete
information compared to that of complete information. An
important observation is that assuming fixed possible losses,
which is reasonable in the case of mining where one can at
most lose the fixed cost hardware (and electricity) or stake, the
more players are in the network, the less information matters.
This also ties in to the value of information i.e., the possible
change in utility from gaining information, which is defined
for a computational setting by Halpern and Pass [72].
B. Consensus
We now look at the example of Byzantine Agreement or in
other words, consensus. The approach here is to use incentives
to bypass impossibility results on Byzantine Agreement or
improve on existing constructions. In order to apply GT to
DS, additional adjustments have to be made. For example,
traditional GT considers deviation from only one agent (as in
a NE) while in practice agents form coalition. In addition, in a
DS it is important to consider multiple types of failures (e.g.,
processors may crash) that are not considered in GT.
In order to account for both of these requirements, the BAR
model defined by Aiyer et al. [73] introduces three different
types of players: Byzantine, altruistic (players that simply
follow the rules) and rational players. In this case, the expected
utility of a rational player is usually defined by considering the
worst configuration of Byzantine players and the worst set of
strategies that those Byzantine players could take, assuming
all other non-Byzantine players obey the specified strategy
profile. The goal of the BAR model is to provide guarantees
similar to those of Byzantine fault tolerance to all rational and
altruistic nodes, as opposed to all correct nodes. Two classes
of protocols meet this goal, Incentive-Compatible Byzantine
Fault Tolerant (IC-BFT) protocols and Byzantine Altruistic
Rational Tolerant (BART) protocols. IC-BFT protocols, which
are a subset of BART protocols, ensure that the protocol
satisfies security and is the optimal one for rational nodes,
while a BART protocol simply ensures security properties.
Groce et al. [74] introduce similar notions, perfect and
statistical security, which state that in the presence of a rational
adversary, the protocol still satisfies the security properties
(e.g., consistency and correctness for consensus). They show
feasibility results of information-theoretic (both perfect and
statistical) Byzantine Agreement, assuming a rational adver-
sary and complete or partial knowledge of the adversary pref-
erences. Their protocols are also more efficient than traditional
Byzantine Agreement protocols.
In the DAMD setting [75], participants are split into obe-
dient, faulty, strategic and adversarial nodes of the network.
Obedient nodes are correctly functioning machines that have
no strategic goals and thus simply perform what they are
programmed to do. Faulty nodes are incorrectly functioning
nodes that also do not have strategic goals but suffer from bugs
or misconfiguration. Strategic nodes are selfish agents that aim
to maximize their utility. Adversarial nodes are adversaries in
the security sense of the word, ranging from honest but curious
to Byzantine in their strategic goals.
The split follows the same lines as that of the BAR model,
but separates the adversarial nodes from those that are faulty
with no strategic goal. Computational restrictions here are
expressed with regards to the solution concepts rather than the
agents. This ties into topics in computational Game Theory,
as a solution to a DAMD problem requires not only that in-
centive compatibility is achieved, but also that the solution be
computationally tractable, which is not always the case. (The
tractability of computing Nash equilibria, or approximations,
is out of the scope of this paper.) The takeaway is that many
solutions on paper are not straightforwardly obtained in an
algorithmic setting, whether centralized or decentralized, and
even approximations may not be enough.
Robustness: When it comes to adapting a NE to consider
coalitions and irrational players Abraham et al. [76] extend the
work of Halpern and Teague [77] to consider multiple players.
They introduce the concept of robustness that encompasses
two notions, resilience and immunity. Resilience captures the
fact that a coalition of players has no incentive to deviate
from the protocol, and is similar to the concept of collusion-
proof NE [9]. Immunity captures the fact that even if some
irrational players are present in the system, the utilities of
the other players are not affected. An equilibrium that is both
resilient to coalitions of up to k players, and immune to up to
t irrational players is then said to be (k, t)-robust
Robustness is a very strong property, but it is hard to achieve
in practice. Clement et al. [78] show that no protocol is (k, t)-
robust if any node may crash and communication is necessary
and costly. When designing cryptocurrencies, however, it is
not unusual to consider that communication is free.
As discussed in Section IV-A with covert adversaries, it can
be helpful to add a form of punishment to enforce correct
behavior by rational players. Halpern et al. [76] define a
(k, t)−punishment strategy such that for any coalition of at
most k players and up to t irrational players, as long as more
than t players use the punishment strategy and the remaining
players play the equilibrium strategy, then if up to k players
collude, they will be worse off than they would have been if
the rational players had played the equilibrium strategy. The
idea is that by having more than t players use the punishment
strategy is enough to stop k players colluding and deviating
from the equilibrium strategy.
Price of Malice: As systems realistically involve rational
and irrational players, it is important to consider how rational
9
players react to the presence of irrational players. Moscibroda
et al. [79] do this by considering a system with only rational
and Byzantine players. They differentiate between an oblivious
and non oblivious model i.e., whether selfish players know the
existence of Byzantine players or not. They define a Byzantine
Nash equilibria that extends NE in the case where irrational
players are present. In a Byzantine Nash equilibria no selfish
player can reduce their perceived expected cost, which depends
on their information, by changing their strategy, given that the
strategies of all other players are fixed.
In GT and MD, a concept very often discussed is the Price
of Anarchy [11], which was introduced in the case of selfish
routing. Moscibroda et al. [79] extend this to their setting, by
defining the Byzantine Price of Anarchy that quantifies how
much an optimal system degrades due to selfish behavior,
when malicious players are introduced. More formally, it is
the ratio between the worst social cost of a Byzantine Nash
equilibrium and the minimal social cost, where the social cost
of a strategy profile is the sum of all individual costs i.e., the
optimality of each outcome.
The price of Malice is used to see how a system of purely
selfish players degrades in the presence of malicious irrational
players. More formally it is the ratio between the worst
Byzantine Nash Equilibrium with malicious players and the
Price of Anarchy in a purely selfish system.
Moscibroda et al. [79] also introduced the idea that Byzan-
tine players can improve the overall system, which they called
the fear factor. The intuition is that the rational players
will adapt their strategies by fear of the actions of irrational
players, rendering the overall system better. The example they
introduce where this can be observed is virus inoculation.
Based on the assumption that some players are irrational and
will not get vaccinated, rational players will be incentivized to
get vaccinated. In the case where everyone is rational, there is
no equilibrium since as long as enough people get vaccinated,
the rest of the population is safe. Thus irrational players here
can make the overall system better.
VI. BLOCKCHAINS
We now consider blockchain based cryptocurrencies, which
are an important example of systems involving aspects of both
traditional security and game theoretic aspects.
Incentives here are explicit as they are monetary and cou-
pled with security. Participants are incentivized to participate
in the network (i.e., become a miner) due to the financial re-
ward associated with it. Moreover, participants are incentivized
to “follow the rules” due to the cost of creating blocks and
risk of financial loss with deviating from the rules.
Despite this, and probably due to their recent apparition
the community has not agreed on a formal model that fully
incorporates incentives and security, although some work is
being done in this direction [80]–[82] to various degrees of
success. Existing work has highlighted failures in incentive
models e.g., selfish mining [3], the verifier’s dilemma [4] and
the miner’s dilemma [5].
In this section we review the work that has been done by the
security and distributed systems communities on blockchains
that consider game-theoretic notions and pinpoint where those
failures can be seen. We also highlight new concepts of interest
that have been introduced in this field as well as how they
relate to what we have previously discussed in this paper.
Well many incentive related papers present attacks i.e.,
deviations to the protocol that rational agents may follow [3]–
[5], [83]), with fewer papers focusing on proving security
while incorporating incentives [48]. This general approach of
proposing an attack and a patch to said attack is similar to the
one taken in Cryptography before provable security existed.
A. Blockchain Consensus Protocols
Nakamoto’s original Bitcoin paper [84] provided only infor-
mal security arguments but several papers have since formally
argued the security of Bitcoin in different models [85]–[87],
usually based in the simulation setting presented in Section III,
but without a consideration of incentives.
In early work in this area Kroll et al. [88] show that
there is a NE in which all players behave consistently with
Bitcoin’s reference implementation, along with infinitely many
equilibria in which they behave otherwise e.g., where they all
agree to change a rule. Attacks like selfish mining [3], [83],
[89] put this into question, showing that their model did not
encompass behavior that could realistically occur.
More recently Garay et al. [48] proved the security of
Bitcoin in the RPD framework that was introduced in Sec-
tion IV-A. Their approach is based on the observation that
Bitcoin works despite its flaws, and they prove that Bitcoin
is secure by relying on the rationality of players rather than
an honest majority. This model inherits the flaws discussed in
Section IV-A e.g., they do not consider fully malicious players.
Their model also does not encompass attacks on Bitcoin’s
incentive structure that we now describe.
Selfish mining [3] involves a rational miner increasing their
expected utility by withholding their blocks instead of broad-
casting them to the rest of network, giving them an advantage
in solving the new proof-of-work and making the rest of the
network waste computation by mining on a block that is not
the top of the chain. Inspired by techniques introduced by
Gervais et al. [90], Sapirshtein et al. [83] use Markov Decision
Processes (MDP) to find the optimal strategy when doing
selfish mining. (MDP are used to help make decisions in a
discrete state space where outcomes are partially random.)
They show that with this strategy, an adversary could mount
a 51% attack with less than 25% of the computational power.
Another attack, the verifier dilemma [4] shows that miners
are not incentivized to verify the content of blocks, especially
when this incurs an important computation on their end.
Mining gaps are another type of attack on incentives [91],
[92] where the time between the creation of blocks increases
because miners wait to include enough transactions (in order
to get the transaction fees). Both papers use simulations
to quantify the attacks, using techniques such as no-regret
learning where miners update their strategy at every “stage”
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of the game in a way to do as close to the best strategy as
possible, had it be known from the beginning or MDP.
Bribery attacks are another family of attacks, which are
often thought of as an example of the tragedy of the commons
that describes a situation when individuals acting selfishly
affect the common good [93]. In our context, it captures the
fact that miners have to balance their aim to maximize their
profit with the risk of affecting the long term health of the
cryptocurrency they mine, potentially reducing its price and
their profit.
Bonneau [94] first proposed that an adversary could mount
a 51% attack at a much reduced cost by renting the necessary
hardware for the length of the attack rather than purchasing it.
More generally, a briber could pay existing miners to mine in
a certain way, without ever needing to acquire any hardware.
This lead to a series of papers [95]–[99] that show it is possible
to introduce new incentives to an existing cryptocurrency,
internally or externally, in ways that do not require trust
between miners and briber.
Mechanisms like Ethereum’s uncle reward, which allows
blocks that were mined but not appended to the blockchain
to later be referenced in another block for a reward can be
used to subsidize the cost of bribery attacks [98] and selfish
mining [100], [101]. This is unfortunate, as uncle rewards
were originally introduced to aid decentralization [102] but
have now been found to introduce incentives that work against
this, by reducing the mining power required to perform certain
attacks.
This puts into question the value of saying that a cryptocur-
rency is incentive compatible if new incentives can later be
added. A cryptocurrency also does not exist in a vacuum, and
external incentives can always manifest in adversarial ways.
Goldfinger attacks, proposed by Kroll et al. [88], involve an
adversary paying miners of a cryptocurrency to sabotage it
by mining empty blocks. In some cases, even the threat of
this type of attack can be enough to kill off a cryptocurrency,
as users would not want their investments to disappear if the
attack happens, and thus would not invest. As a Goldfinger
attack can be implemented through a smart contract in another
cryptocurrency [98], it is not inconceivable that this could be
attempted in practice. This clearly shows that incentives from
outside the cryptocurrency itself must be considered.
Budish [103] proposes an economic analysis of 51% attack
and double spending and shows that the Nakamoto consensus
has inherent economic limitations. In particular, he shows
from a strictly economic point of view that the security of
the blockchain relies scarce, non-repurposable resources (i.e.,
ASICs) used by miners as opposed to Nakamoto’s vision of
“one-CPU-one-vote”, and that the blockchain is vulnerable
to sabotage at a cost linear in the amount of specialized
computational equipment devoted to its maintenance.
Systems based on BlockDAGs rather than blockchains have
been proposed to address the outlined incentive failures [82],
[104]–[108]. In this model, the data structure is a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) of blocks, meaning that each block
can have more than one parent block. When creating a new
block, a miner points to all the blocks that they are aware
of, revealing their view of the blockchain. This exposes more
of the decision making of the players and relates to the idea
of hidden actions discussed in Section V. Players could still
however lie and pretend not to be aware of blocks but this can
be disincentivized by the protocol (i.e., a block that references
more blocks will have a bigger reward), thus incentivizing to
reveal the truth, which addresses the hidden action problem.
Due to some additional inherent flaws in Bitcoin e.g.,
scalability and energy consumption, new design papers are
constantly proposed by both the academic community and
industry, but many leave the treatment of incentives as future
work. In particular, very few papers propose an incentive
scheme associated with their consensus protocols [82], [109]–
[111]. Moreover, the solution concepts considered in these
papers are often overly-simplistic; e.g., some coalition proof
NE that does not consider the impact of irrational play-
ers [109]–[112]. Only Solidus [81] and Fantômette [82] con-
sider robustness (introduced in Section V), although Solidus
leaves formal proof as future work. In his draft work about
incentives in Casper [113], Buterin introduces the griefing
factor which is the ratio of the penalty incurred to the victim
of an attack and the penalty incurred by the attacker. The
idea of a griefing factor intuitively makes sense, as disputes
in the real world can be resolved by fining a party according
to the damages caused, and from a modelling point of view
gives a quantifiable punishment that can be explicitly taken
into account when computing equilibria. He also proves that
following the protocol in Casper is a NE as long as no player
holds more than a third of the deposit at stake.
Due to the lack of formal model, it can be expected that
more incentive related attacks will be proposed. For example,
attacks on cryptocurrencies using PoS are now already ap-
pearing [114]–[116], further highlighting the need for better
models.
Additionally to the consensus rules, another route to im-
proving the incentivization of cryptocurrencies is through their
transaction fees market. As pointed out by Lavi et al. [117]
“competition in the fee market is what keeps the rational
behavior of Bitcoin’s users (partially) aligned with the goal
of buying enough security for the entire system” and is thus
crucial for its security. This problem is related to that of
auction theory [118] and some of the literature of that field
could be used here.
B. Incentivizing decentralization
Looking back at the initial success of Bitcoin, it has evolved
to become different in many ways from the intended design
and the idea of “one-CPU-one-vote” envisioned by Nakamoto.
Because the price of mining has increased exponentially with
the popularity of Bitcoin, miners have started forming mining
pools, where they join their resources to mine, together, more
blocks. This is opposite to the decentralization envisioned in
the original Bitcoin paper. The reason for doing so is that
by pooling their resources miners will be able to mine more
blocks, they will then share their gain accordingly, meaning
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that their average payoff is theoretically the same but their
variance is reduced. Due to the depreciation of the hardware
this actually means that they increase their payoff by doing so.
Mining hardware itself has changed, as ASICs have become
more popular, and essential for profitable mining.
This is obviously a big threat to the security of cryptocur-
rencies as this could enable 51% attacks, which have already
happened to other cryptocurrencies. As of January 2019, the
most important 51% attack has targeted Ethereum Classic,
which is the 16th largest cryptocurrency by market cap [119].
As such attacks have gradually targeted cryptocurrencies that
are ranked higher on the list, it can be expected that this trend
will continue, in particular when prices of such attacks are
favored by market downturns.
The centralization of cryptocurrencies’ has been empirically
analyzed by Gencer et al. [120] who measured how decentral-
ized Bitcoin’s and Ethereum’s network are. They found that
three or four mining pools control more than half of the hash
power of the network. This highlights the need for further
research studying this occurrence of centralization and how
decentralization can be maintained in practice.
Several papers propose a game-theoretic analysis of the
mining pools. Arnosti et al. [121] model hardware investments
from miners as a a game, Leonardos et al. [122] model
mining as an oceanic game, used to analyze decision making
in settings with small numbers of “big” players and large
numbers of individually insignificant players. Lewenberg et
al. [123] model the mining game as a transferable utility
coalitional game, which allows players to form coalitions
and to divide their payoffs amongst themselves. This game
is defined by a set of players and a characteristic function that
specifies the monetary value that any coalition can achieve
when cooperating. As a solution concept, they use the core,
the set of feasible allocations that cannot be improved upon
by a coalition, which describes stability in coalitional games.
It captures the condition under which the agents would want
to form coalitions rather than not i.e., whether there exist any
subcoalition where agents could have gained more on their
own. This concept is often opposed to the Shapley value in
Game Theory, which defines a fair way to divide the payment
among the members of a coalition based on their respective
contribution, but without any consideration for stability, unlike
the core. Lewenberg et al. additionally define the defection
function that, intuitively, captures the fact that not every agent
subset can collaborate and form a new coalition. They focus
on defection functions that allow for one coalition to merge
with a subset of another coalition, or for a subset of coalition
to split from its coalition. They show that mining pools are
generally unstable, no matter how the revenue is shared, some
miners would be incentivized to switch to a different pool
Eyal [5] also studies the stability of mining pools and pro-
poses an attack where pools infiltrate other pools to sabotage
them by joining the pool and earning rewards, but without
actually contributing i.e., not revealing when they find a
PoW solution. There exists configurations in which this attack
constitutes a NE and an example of a tragedy of the commons.
Another way mining pools could attack each other is
through distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, with the
aim of lowering the expected success of a competing pool
(large ones in particular), rather than increasing their own
computational power [124]. Mining pools being subject to
denial of service often happens. Over a two year period, Vasek
et al. [125] found that 62.5% of mining pools accounting for
more than 5% of the Bitcoin network power had been targeted,
while only 17.1% of the smaller pools had been targeted.
This has general implications for the mining ecosystem, as a
peaceful equilibrium would require an increase to the cost of
attacks and to the miner migration rate (i.e., miners switching
pools), with no pool being significantly more attractive than
others [126].
Brünjes et al. [127] introduce and study reward sharing
schemes that promote the fair formation of stake pools in
a PoS blockchain. They argue that a NE only considers
myopic players, i.e., players who ignore the responses to their
own actions. As a result, they consider the notion of non-
myopic Nash equilibrium (based on previous work by Fiat et
al. [128]), which captures the effects that a certain move will
incur anticipating a strategic response from the other players.
Luu et al. [80] use smart contracts to decentralize mining
by incuring mining fees lower than centralized mining pools.
Miller et al. [129] present several definitions and constructions
for “non-outsourceable” puzzles. Both of these papers use
informal arguments to justify their construction as opposed
to a formal model.
This once more highlights the trend of attack-then-patch and
is another argument for having a strong incentive model that
deal with (de)centralization.
C. Payment Channels
In order to overcome the scalability issues of Bitcoin, a
new concept, referred to as layer 2 or payment channels has
been proposed [130]. The idea is that since the network cannot
handle enough transactions, participants can take some trans-
actions off-chain i.e., outside the main network, by opening a
channel between themselves. This is done by locking a deposit
on the blockchain, opening the channel and transacting on the
channel, then settling the overall balance of all transactions
on-chain so that the blockchain will see only two transactions
(locking the funds and settling the balance).
Several designs have been proposed to achieve this [130]–
[132]. The high level idea is that participants will create
evidence of each of their transactions (e.g., using signatures) so
that whenever someone tries to cheat the other party can prove
it and receive the cheating party’s deposit as compensation.
For example, if Alice pays 1 bitcoin to Bob who then pays 2
bitcoin to Alice, Bob could try to cheat by broadcasting the
first transactions to the blockchain, with the obsolete balances,
but Alice could broadcast to the blockchain the transaction
signed by Bob to prove cheating has occurred.
In this setting, the security relies on the fact that cheating
is easily detectable due to cryptographic evidence and on the
financial punishment associated with it. So again, incentives
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are tightly linked to security. A few papers [131], [133] present
formal models to analyze the security of these payment chan-
nels. They are based on the UC-model presented in Section III
but do not consider utilities although it is an important part of
the security of the system.
In order to facilitate payment channels, a routing solution
has been proposed [134]. The idea is that if Alice wants to
open a channel with Bob and both Bob and Alice already have
an existing channel open with Charlie, then Charlie can act as
a router between Alice and Bob, without them needing to open
a new channel. There are usually difficulties in this case, due
to the need for collaterals to be locked by everyone on the
routing path. This work is related to the one on selfish routing
discussed in Section V.
A problem with payment channels is the requirement for
participants to be online to detect cheating i.e., the cheater
broadcasting an old balance to the blockchain. McCorry et
al. [135] propose delegating this task to a third party but it
is unclear how incentives should be designed with regards to
that third party.
D. Fairness
Fairness in cryptocurrencies is implicitely captured by the
notion of chain quality introduced by Garay et al. [87], which
informally states that an adversary should not contribute more
blocks to the blockchain than what they are supposed to
i.e., proportionally to their computational power in the PoW
setting.
In the PoS setting, Fanti et al. [114] define the notion of
equitability that corresponds to how much a node’s initial
investment (i.e., stake) can grow or shrink, and address the
problem of the “rich get richer” in PoS cryptocurrencies
(which arguably also exists in PoW cryptocurrencies). They
propose a geometric reward function that they prove is more
equitable i.e., the distribution of stake stays more stable. In
general, the problem of compounding of wealth is reinforced
by the fact that early adopters of a cryptocurrency have a
significant advantage, benefiting from the ease of mining (or
staking) and greatly cheaper coin prices in the early days.
Dealing with this is more of a macroeconomic problem that
to the best of our knowledge has not yet received any attention.
E. Summary
We see that the blockchain community has not made much
use of the concepts introduced in the Sections IV and V. Most
of the work done in this space either considers only rational
adversaries [48], or considers only cryptographic properties
and thus fully malicious adversaries but without considering
any incentives [85]–[87], or considers solution concepts such
as NE that are too basic for this setting [88]. Consequently,
new attacks on incentives are being discovered at a high rate.
Finally, we note that all of the above analysis holds assum-
ing that Bitcoin (or the underlying cryptocurrency considered)
indeed has a monetary value. The question of what confers
that value to a cryptocurrency is an interesting open problem
given the volatility of cryptocurrencies exchange rates.
VII. DISCUSSION
We now discuss the ways in which the concepts presented
in the previous sections could be used.
First, we have already argued that NE are too weak as a
solution concepts for blockchain protocols because they do not
consider coalitions or fully malicious players. We argue that
(k, t)−robustness, presented in Section V, is a better fitted
solution concept. So far this concept has only been used in
Fantômette [82] and a preliminary version of Solidus [81].
Even though it does not consider malicious adversaries, the
RPD framework would still work well in the case of payment
channels. In that case, even if an adversary is fully malicious,
they could cheat but if they do so the other party will then
be able to claim all of their deposit. In that case the non-
cheating party would end up in a better situation, as they
would earn even more. The RPD model is then perfectly
adapted as even an irrational adversary cannot harm an honest
player. Moreover, as it is clear how the adversary can cheat
(by broadcasting an old transaction), RPD is useful since it
provides a relaxed functionality that specifically allows bad
behaviour. A cost will be associated with this bad behavior
e.g., in the case of payment channels the whole deposit of
the cheating player will be taken away. Furthermore, formal
models that have been proposed for payment channels are
already based on the UC model [131], [133], thus extending
them to consider the RPD would not be as hard as the tedious
part is very often the UC emulation.
Alongside RPD, we also presented work on BMG. This
could have very fruitful applications when applied to cryp-
tocurrencies given that many situations are straightforwardly
modeled as games involving computations e.g., mining. The
equivalence theorems between secure computation and game
theoretic implementations also give a direct connection to
standard notions of security, although they are given for
specific variants of implementations and secure computation
that may not match those required in practice. Further results
in this domain could however prove very useful. As the
cryptographic side is founded on the ideas that also form the
basis of simulation based Cryptography and UC model it may
be possible to connect both frameworks. The given example
of a game that deals with covert adversaries also shows that
this can be used in practice, even if it is not clear that applying
this method will produce more efficient solutions to problems.
In Bitcoin, the blockchain takes up a few hundred giga-
bytes of space and most users do not run a full node that
requires storing the whole blockchain and verifying every
block. Instead they use light clients (i.e., simplified payment
verification, SPV) that store only hashes of the blocks and
connect to full nodes that they must trust, which is not ideal.
This problem can be compared to the problem of free riding
in P2P file systems, and ideas from that context could be used
to help incentivize users to run full nodes. In the same vein,
Bitcoin’s PoW is comparable to total effort and best shots
public goods, discussed in Section V. The security of the
system depends both on the total hashrate of the network (it
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is less expensive to attack a network with a smaller hashrate)
and on the maximum hashrate of a single player or pool (as
a single player detaining half or close of the total hash power
represents a threat for the system).
The fear factor, introduced in Section V, could also be used.
As explained in Section VI, with the verifier’s dilemma [4],
verifying the content of blocks is not an equilibrium, however,
some users may be motivated to do it by fear that others will
not. For example, a user may choose to run a full node rather
than an SPV, which would improve the overall system. Under
this assumption, an equilibrium may be reachable.
The Price of Malice could also inspire a new measure
that quantifies the trade-off between blockchain based system
and traditional consensus protocols. Indeed, blockchain-based
system are intended to be more scalable as they are meant
to handle open participation, compared to classical consensus
that requires the many messages to be exchanged, but in the
case of Bitcoin this comes at the price of PoW so there is an
incurred economic cost.
As differentiating between malicious behavior and genuine
latency is hard, especially in PoS systems, the Price of Un-
accountability could be a useful measure in evaluating them.
Since this problem is related to that of Hidden actions, we
could also explore using the principal-agent model there as
presented in Section V.
Cryptocurrencies are the first family of distributed systems
that includes creation of new money so transfer functions could
be used here e.g., by the designer to find the optimal reward
scheme of a cryptocurrency. Could we find an equivalent to
the revelation principle here, for example by using blockDAGs
that reveal more about the decision making of a player?
Another avenue for the design of blockchain based systems
could be to investigate implementing direct reciprocity, as
opposed to indirect reciprocity, to incentivize good behavior
and force miners to cooperate more, as discussed in Section V.
Lastly, something missing from the blockchain literature is
a general framework for comparing and evaluating consensus
protocols. Most of them operate under very different assump-
tions and the outcome would be greatly different when chang-
ing those. For example, Algorand does not consider rational
players, providing stronger assumptions than other protocols
and it is not clear how rational players could behave in this
setting. Others do not consider the centralization problem or
compounding of wealth.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Security researchers and cryptographers have been inter-
ested in incorporating game theoretic notions to their models
for many years. In this work, we have highlighted existing
concepts and explained how and where they could be used for
specific applications.
The approach taken in most of the papers that we described
here is to extend a field by for example incorporating utility
functions (Rational Cryptography) or computation (Bayesian
Machine Games). No completely new theory has appeared and
it would be interesting to see a new theory built from the
ground up to address considerations of incentives at all stages
of the design process, rather than adapting existing models.
We hope that this paper will give some inspiration towards
new formal models.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide formal definitions for some of
the concepts presented in the main body of the paper that are
not formally defined.
Game Theory: To start off, we introduce the standard
definitions for Bayesian games and mechanisms.
Bayesian game setting A Bayesian game setting is a tuple
(N,O,Θ,Pr, u), where:
• N is a finite set of n players;
• O is a set of outcomes;
• Θ = Θ1, · · · ,Θn is a set of possible joint type vectors
• Pr is a (common prior) probability distribution on Θ;
and
• u = (u1, · · · , un), where ui : O×R → R is the utility
function for each player i
Mechanism for a Bayesian game setting A mechanism for
a Bayesian game setting (N,O,Θ, p, u) is a pair (A,M),
where
• A = A1 × · · · × An, where Ai is the set of actions
available to agent i ∈ N
• M : A → D(O) maps each action profile to a
distribution over outcomes
Game Theory and Cryptography: We now move on to
concepts presented in Section IV.
ǫ−subgame perfect equilibrium [37] Let GM be an attack
game. A staretgy profile (A,Π) is an ǫ−subgame per-
fect equilibrium in GM if: (1) for any Π′ ∈ ITMn,
uD(Π
′, A(Π′)) ≤ uD(Π, A(Π)) + ǫ, and (2) for any
A′ ∈ ITM, uA(Π, A′(Π)) ≤ uA(Π, A(Π)) + ǫ.
Attack-payoff security [37] Let M = (F , 〈F〉, v) be an
attack model and let Π be a protocol that realizes
functionality 〈F〉. Π is attack-payoff secure in M if
~UΠ,〈F〉
negl
≤ ~UΦ
F ,〈F〉 where ΦF is the “dummy” F hybrid
protocol (i.e.,the protocol that forwards all inputs and
outputs from the functionality F , see Section III) and
~UΠ,〈F〉 is the maximized ideal expected payoff of an
adversary.
Incentive compatibility [48] Let Π be a protocol and P be a
set of PT protocols that have access to the same hybrids
as Π. We say that Π is P− incentive compatible in the
attack model M if and only if for some Adv (Π,Adv)
is a (P, ITM)− subgame perfect equilibrium in the attack
game defined by M.
Bayesian Machine Game [50] A Bayesian ma-
chine game G is described by a tuple
(N,M,Θ,Pr, C1, . . . , Cm, u1, . . . , u2) where:
• N is the set of players, M is the set of possible
machines
• Θ ⊆ ({0, 1}∗)m+1 is the set of type profiles where the
(m+1)st element in the profile corresponds to nature’s
type
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• Pr is a distribution on Θ
• Ci is a complexity function
• ui : T × ({0, 1}∗)m × N → R is player i’s utility
function.
Given a Bayesian machine game G, a machine profile ~M ,
and ǫ ≥ 0, Mi is an ǫ-best response to ~M−i (the tuple
consisting of all machines in ~M other than Mi) if, for
every M
′
i ∈ M,
UGi [(Mi,
~M−i)] ≥ U
G
i [(M
′
i ,
~M−i)]− ǫ. (1)
~M is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of G if, for all players i, Mi
is an ǫ-best response to ~M−i. A Nash equilibrium is a
0-Nash equilibrium.
Universal implementation [50] Suppose that G is a set of
n-player canonical games, Z is a subsets of N , F and
F ′ are mediators, M1, · · · ,Mn are interactive machines,
p : N × N → N and ǫ : N → R. (M,F ′ is a (G,Z, p)-
universal implementation of F with error ǫ if, for all n,
all games G ∈ G with input length n and all Z ′ ⊆ Z
if ~ΛF is a p(n, ·)-robust Z ′-safe ǫ-NE in the mediated
machine game (G,F) then
1) (Preserving equilibrium) ~M is a Z ′-safe ǫ-NE in the
mediated machine game (G,F ′)
2) (Preserving Action Distributions) For each type profile
~t, the action profile induced by ~ΛF in (G,F) is
identically distributed to then action profile induced by
M in (G,F ′).
Sequential equilibrium in computational games [57] A
pair ( ~M, µ) consisting of a machine profile ~M and
a belief system µ is called a belief assessment. A
belief assessment ( ~M, µ) is an interim (resp. ex ante)
sequential equilibrium in a machine game G if µ is
compatible with ~M and for all players i, states q of Mi,
and machines M
′
i compatible with Mi and q such that
(Mi, q,M
′
i ) ∈ M (the set of possible machines) (resp.
(Mi, q,M
′
i ) is a local variant of Mi), we have
Ui( ~M |q, µ) ≥ Ui(((Mi, q,M
′
i ),
~M−i)|q, µ) (2)
Game Theory and Distributed Design: Finally, we give
definitions for concepts presented in Section V.
Incentive-Compatible Byzantine Fault Tolerant (IC-BFT) protocols [73]
A protocol is IC-BFT if it guarantees the specified set
of safety and liveness properties and if it is in the best
interest of all rational nodes to follow the protocol
exactly.
Byzantine Altruistic Rational Tolerant (BART) protocols [73]
A protocol is BART if it guarantees the specified set
of safety and liveness properties in the presence of all
rational deviations from the protocol.
Perfect security [74] A protocol for broadcast or consensus
is perfectly secure against rational adversaries controlling
t players with utility U if for every t-adversary there is
a strategy S such that for any choice of input for honest
players 1. (S is tolerable): S induces a distribution of
final outputs D in which no security condition is violated
with nonzero probability, and 2. (S is Nash): For any
strategy S′ 6= S with induced output distribution D’ :
U(D) ≥ U(D′).
Statistical Security [74] A protocol for broadcast or con-
sensus is statistically secure against rational adversaries
controlling t players with utility U if for every t-adversary
there is a strategy S such that for any choice of input for
honest players S induces a distribution of final outputs
Dk when the security parameter is k and the following
properties hold: 1. (S is tolerable): no security condition
is violated with nonzero probability in Dk for any k,
and 2. (S is statistical Nash): for any strategy S′ 6= S
with induced output distributions D′k there is a negligible
function negl(.) such that U(Dk) + negl(k) > U(D′k).
(k,t)-robustness [76] A strategy profile σ is a (k,t)-robust
equilibrium if for all C, T ⊆ N, C ∩ T = ∅, |C| ≤
k, |T | ≤ t ∀τt ∈ ST ∀φC ∈ C we have: ui(σ−T , τT ) ≥
ui(σ−C∩T , φC , τT )
(k,t)-punishment [76] A joint strategy ρ is a (k, t)-
punishment strategy with respect to σ if for all C, T, P ⊆
N such that C, T, P are disjoint, |C| ≤ k, |T | ≤
t, and |P | > t, for all τT ∈ ST , for all
φC ∈ SC , for all i ∈ C we have ui(σT , τT ) >
ui(σN−(C∪T∪P ), φC , τT , ρP ).
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